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NOTE
LOCKED UP, THEN LOCKED OUT: THE CASE FOR
LEGISLATIVE-RATHER THAN EXECUTIVE-
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM
Arnanda J. Wong t
A cohesive anti-felon disenfranchisement perspective has
gained traction over the last two decades in America. Schol-
ars have harshly criticized disenfranchisement provisions for
their insulation and perpetuation of nonwhite marginalization
d la Jim Crow. Other critics have also decried felon disen-
franchisement for barring prior felons from full social integra-
tion. Still more critics point to how disenfranchisement
provisions inequitably affect election outcomes. State leaders,
recognizing the prevalent attitude against felon disen-
franchisement, have taken signflcant measures to mitigate
disenfranchisement laws-for example, some state governors
have issued executive orders categorically re-enfranchising
ex-felons. These types of actions are the focus on this Note.
Certainly, unilateral executive action is efficient and has been
effective in the short-term. However, this Note contends that
there are distinct political efficacy and consent theory con-
cerns that emerge when broad felon disenfranchisement re-
form comes from unilateral executive action. Moreover, this
Note argues, gubernatorial action is by and large an inconsis-
tent solution that ultimately fails to address the systemic civic
deprivation of nonwhite communities. This Note concludes by
proposing federal legislative action-specifically, the Democ-
racy Restoration Act-as a more favorable method of felon
disenfranchisement reform.
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INTRODUCTION
Forty-four-year-old Keith Sellars lives in Alamance County,
North Carolina, with his five children. He was born and raised
in Alamance County'-there is no other place in the world that
he would call home.2 He is an established member of the com-
munity and has voted in the county many times before.3 Mr.
Sellars' fixed position in the Alamance County community is
what makes his arrest and jailing for merely voting so concern-
ing; there appears to be no place more appropriate for him to
vote than Alamance. "I didn't know .. . I thought I was practic-
ing my right," he told the New York Times when describing his
1 Keith Sellars, Keith Sellars: Threatened with Prison for Voting, FAYETTEVILLE
OBSERVER (Nov. 3, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.fayobserver.com/article/
20181103/OPINION/ 181109470 [https://perma.cc/DDH9-YXCN]; see Jack
Healy, Arrested, Jailed and Charged with a Felony. For Voting., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/us/arrested-voting-north-caro
lina.html [https://perma.cc/N97V-L3M9].
2 Sellars, supra note 1.
3 Id.
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arrest.4 Mr. Sellars was one of twelve people in Alamance
County who were charged with violating North Carolina's felon
disenfranchisement law during the 2016 election.5 The state's
law bars people on felony probation or parole from voting.6
Moreover, nine of the twelve were black, which drew the na-
tion's attention to North Carolina's history of suppressing black
votes.7 "It smacks of Jim Crow," commented Barrett Brown,
the head of Alamance County's NAACP. 8
Mr. Brown's comment is far from the first to compare that
modem felon disenfranchisement to Jim Crow. For years, felon
disenfranchisement has been hotly criticized for being a gov-
ernment-sanctioned tool of white supremacy. Critics con-
tend-with substantial empirical support-that "[flelony
disenfranchisement policies have a disproportionate impact on
communities of color."9 Consider that black citizens are over
four times more likely to be disenfranchised than nonblack
citizens, and that one of every thirteen black citizens in the
United States has been or is currently subject to disen-
franchisement.10 The racialized effects of disenfranchisement
are painful on both macro- and micro-levels. Not only does
felon disenfranchisement siphon political power from commu-
nities, it curtails civic engagement on the individual level.
Taranta Holman, who was also arrested for voting in Alamance
County, had never voted before 2016.11 Now, regardless of
whether Mr. Holman is found guilty of illegal voting, he says he
will never vote again-it will always be "too much of a risk."12
The American public has taken notice of felon disen-
franchisement's negative effects. Polls indicate that citizens
across the United States strongly support extending the vote to
ex-felons living within the community.'3 And rightfully so,
given the large volume of legal and academic scholarship criti-
cizing felon disenfranchisement policies.'4 In response to pub-









11 Healy, supra note 1.
12 Id.
13 Jeff Manza et al., Public Attitudes Toward Felon Disenfranchisement in the
United States, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 275, 283 (2004).
14 There is substantial criticism against felon disenfranchisement policies
specifically for preserving historic structures of white supremacy. See, e.g.,
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lic pressure to re-enfranchise felons, state actors have made
significant mitigating changes to their disenfranchisement pol-
icies. As of 2018, twenty-three states have made alterations to
their laws that re-enfranchised thousands of citizens.15
Many of these alterations have come from leading state
executives. For example, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo
issued Executive Order No. 181 in April 2018 which restored
the right to vote to 35,000 New York parolees.16 Former Ken-
tucky Governor Steve Beshear17 granted over 9,000 restoration
requests between 2007 and 2015, while former Iowa Governor
Tom Vilsack'I issued Executive Order No. 42, which restored
voting rights to an estimated 115,000 Iowans for over six
years. 19 Current Iowa governor Kim Reynolds has made restor-
ing voting rights to felons one of her administration's key pri-
orities.20 She called for Iowan legislators to amend the state
constitution's disenfranchisement provision in her 2019 Con-
dition of the Address, stating:
Shadman Zaman, Violence and Exclusion: Felon Disenfranchisement as a Badge of
Slavery, 46 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 223 (2015) (contending that felon disen-
franchisement should be challenged on Thirteenth Amendment grounds). But see
Roger Clegg et al., The Case Against Felon Voting, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
1 (2008) (arguing in favor of felon disenfranchisement laws).
15 MORGAN MCLEOD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: Two DEC-
ADES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM 3 (2018), https://www.sentencing-
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Expanding-the-Vote- 1997-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K3BP-BXFQ].
16 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 181 (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.governor.ny.gov/
sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_ 181.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LE2-
AVJL]; see Sasha Abramsky, At Long Last, Andrew Cuomo Restores the Vote for
New York Parolees, NATION (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/
at-long-last-andrew-cuomo-restores-the-vote-for-new-york-parolees/ [https://
perma.cc/X35U-YYPA].
17 Morgan Watkins, Gov. Bevin Restores Ex-Felons' Civil Rights for the First
Time, COURIER JOURNAL (Apr. 3, 2017, 7:03 PM), https://www.courier-journal
.com/story/news/politics/201 7/04/03/gov-bevin-restores-felons-civil-rights/
99982776/ [https://perma.cc/G8M8-PEJJ].
18 Kate Zernike, Iowa Governor Will Give Felons the Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES
(June 18, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/18/us/iowa-governor-
will-give-felons-the-right-to-vote.html [https://perma.cc/GJ4G-7CUB].
19 Executive Order 42 was rescinded by former governor Vilsack's successor
Terry Branstad. Makeda Yohannes, Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Iowa,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/analy
sis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-fowa [https://perma.cc/8ST9-LBHZ] [here-
inafter Yohannes, Iowa].
20 Barbara Rodriguez & Stephen Gruber-Miller, Iowa PoWl Nearly Two-thirds
of Iowans Say Felons Should Regain Voting Rights After Completing Sentence, DES
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Through the power of clemency, the governor can restore
those rights, and I have done that 88 times since taking
office. But I don't believe that voting rights should be forever
stripped, and I don't believe restoration should be in the
hands of a single person. . .. Our founders gave us a process
to amend the constitution, should the passage of time change
our view. Let's begin that process now. I believe Iowans rec-
ognize the power of redemption; let's put this issue in their
hands.2 1
And in 2016, former Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe immedi-
ately and categorically re-enfranchised all ex-felons in Vir-
ginia.22 Although this order was ultimately overturned,
McAuliffe's office subsequently restored the voting rights of
over 172,000 impacted Virginia citizens on an individual
basis.23
State legislatures have also been active in re-enfranchising
felons. In 2016, California amended Section 2101 of the Elec-
tions Code to allow convicted felons sentenced to county jails to
vote while in custody.24 And on November 6, 2018, Florida
voters restored voting rights to over one million Florida felons
via a constitutional amendment, which automatically restored
voting rights for the majority of people who have completed
their felony sentences.2 5 Florida's amendment, in particular,
was a cheering victory for disenfranchisement reformists. Pre-
viously, Florida took a hardline stance against felon political
participation, permanently removing the right to vote from all
Floridians with prior felony convictions.2 6
21 READ: Gov. Kim Reynolds' Full 2019 Condition of the State, DES MOINES









24 See A.B. 2466, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), https://leginfo.legisla
ture.ca.gov/faces/bllNavClient.xhtml?billid=201520160AB2466 [https://per
ma.cc/J993-RCYD].
25 See Nicole Chavez, Florida Restores Voting Rights to More Than I Million
Felons, CNN (Nov. 7, 2018, 4:07 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/07/poli
tics/florida-felons-voting-rights/index.html [https://perma.cc/3CDS-L9DE].
26 See Makeda Yohannes, Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida, BREN-





However, few states have endorsed comprehensive felon
disenfranchisement reform. Many still bar ex-felons from the
ballot box. Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee maintain life-
time voting bans for felons convicted of murder or rape, regard-
less of whether such individuals complete their sentence.2 7
Furthermore-in spite of their efforts at reform-Kentucky and
Iowa still maintain permanent voting bans for all prior and
current felons, although Iowa appears to be strongly consider-
ing amending its constitution's disenfranchisement provi-
sion.2 8 Only Maine and Vermont fully enfranchise felons, even
while they are incarcerated.29
America requires sweeping felon re-enfranchisement, and
the time for reform is nigh. Felon disenfranchisement laws
perpetuate structural racism ingrained within the American
electoral system and criminal justice system by disproportion-
ately affecting people of color, particularly those in the black
and Latinx communities. State amendments and public pol-
ling strongly suggest hat the American public recognizes these
effects and favors re-enfranchisement. Thus, progressive re-
formists ought to strike now and push for re-enfranchisement
now, while the iron is hot.
The thesis of this Note is that felon disenfranchisement is a
modern Jim Crow regime whose reform has overwhelming pub-
lic support, and that mere state gubernatorial reform a la
Cuomo, McAuliffe, and Beshear has dangerous consequences
for governmental legitimacy and interstate consistency. Be-
cause of this, reformists ought to pursue a federal legislative
solution-specifically, the Democracy Restoration Act-which
is constitutional under Article I of the Constitution, as well as
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Part I lays out a broad history of American felony disen-
franchisement law. Part II argues that felon disenfranchise-
ment laws need to be repealed as they disparately affect
marginalized, nonwhite communities and threaten the integrity
of the American electoral and criminal justice systems. Part II
then discusses the substantial empirical evidence that Ameri-
cans recognize these detriments and are strongly in favor of
felon disenfranchisement reform. Part III then uses a close
27 State Felon Voting Rights, PROCON (Nov. 7, 2018), https://felonvoting.pro
con.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000286 (https://perma.cc/HGV5-9JN5].
28 Yohannes, Florida, supra note 26; see Rodriguez & Gruber-Miller, supra
note 20.
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examination of previous Virginia governor Terry McAuliffe's
2016 Executive Order enacting mass re-enfranchisement o il-
lustrate that-while gubernatorial action has been the domi-
nant mode of felon disenfranchisement reform for the past two
decades-organizers ought to consider federal legislative action
for a more legitimate, more permanent solution. Part IV will
then advocate for and argue the constitutionality of the Democ-
racy Restoration Act.3 0
I
BACKGROUND: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAW
As a preliminary matter, this Note's discussion benefits
from a broad understanding of felon disenfranchisement law's
history. A fuller understanding of disenfranchisement's prob-
lematic entrenchment in America's political and societal struc-
tures at large bolsters this Note's argument that the nation
requires a comprehensive federal legislative solution to the
problem of disenfranchisement.3 1
A. Felony Disenfranchisement's Roots in Jim Crow Law
Felon disenfranchisement law is primarily a Western con-
struct, stemming from the Greek and Roman traditions of "civil
death," which penalized criminals by removing their political
rights, such as the right to vote in the general assembly.32
Great Britain called their system of disenfranchisement "out-
lawry" and imported the penalty to their American colonies,
which typically used disenfranchisement as a punishment for
"morally repugnant" crimes.3 3
Following the American Revolution, the vast majority of
state constitutions maintained felon and other disenfranchise-
ment provisions intended to preserve "the purity of the ballot
30 Democracy Restoration Act of 2018, H.R. 6612, 115th Cong. (2018).
31 See infra Part III.
32 See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 316 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Indeed, the
practice of disenfranchising those convicted of crimes is of ancient origin... . [I]n
ancient Athens, the penalty for certain crimes was placement in a state of 'in-
famy,' which entailed the loss of those rights.. .. The Roman Republic also
employed infamy as a penalty. . . .").
33 See, e.g., Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchisement with
Citizen Theory, 22 HARV. BIACKLETIER L.J. 53, 54-56 (2006) (describing pre-Ameri-
can methods of felon disenfranchisement); George Brooks, Comment, Felon Dis-
enfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851,
852-53 (2005) ("The first disenfranchisement laws in America appeared in the
1600s, typically as punishment for morality crimes such as drunkenness, and
were present from the earliest times of the Republic." (footnote omitted)).
2019]1 1685
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box."34 These laws were legitimized by Article I, Section 2 of the
Constitution, reading "the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each States shall have the Qualifications requisite
for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature."36
In the late 1800s, states-especially those in what would
become the Jim Crow South-began to weaponize felon disen-
franchisement laws in response to the 1870 ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment, which attempted to extend the vote to
male citizens regardless of "race, color, or previous condition of
servitude."3 6 The following excerpted material from the 1868
Constitutional Convention of South Carolina following the Civil
War illustrates white supremacy's mobilization of felon disen-
franchisement to obstruct nonwhite votes.
The Legislature of 1865 . . . enacted laws which made the
most trivial offence a felony, and the intent of those laws was
to deprive every colored man of their [sic] right of citizenship.
If a colored man struck a white man, all he had to do was go
before an officer of the law, and declare that the colored man
struck him with intent to kill, and that offence, according to
the law of 1865, constituted a felony.3 7
At this time, South Carolina had disenfranchised criminals
who had been convicted of what were considered "black crimes"
including "thievery, adultery, arson, wife beating, housebreak-
ing, and attempted rape," but not including murder or fight-
ing.3 8 Likewise, Mississippi politicians reframed state
disenfranchisement laws that had previously disenfranchised
all convicts to specifically and exclusively target people con-
victed of minor "black crimes" including burglary, theft, and
34 Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585 (1884) (affirming conviction for
illegal voting in violation of Alabama's felon disenfranchisement provision).
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting
Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement ofMinority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
727, 733 (1998) (describing the cycle of minority disenfranchisement); Kamala
Kelkar, This Year, Laws with Roots to the Civil War Prevented 6.1 Million from
Voting, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/
civil-war-laws-prevented-voting [https://perma.cc/VT4Y-C4PE] (discussing his-
tory of American felon disenfranchisement reform); Brooks, supra note 33, at 857
(recounting the use of disenfranchisement tools in the Jim Crow South).
37 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 540 (J.
Woodruff ed., Charleston, Denny & Perry, 1868) (statement of Delegate T.J.
Robertson).
38 Brooks, supra note 33, at 858 (quoting Nathan P. Litwin, Note, Defending
an Unjust System: How Johnson v. Bush Upheld Felon Disenfranchisement and
Perpetuated Voter Inequality in Florida, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 236, 238 (2003)).
[Vol. 104:16791686
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arson.3 9 And in Virginia, state delegate and future United
States Senator Carter Glass asserted that the purpose of the
state's felon disenfranchisement law was to "eliminate the
darkey as a political factor in this State ... so that in no single
county of the Commonwealth will there be the least concern felt
for the complete supremacy of the white race in the affairs of
government."4 0
Suffice to say that felon disenfranchisement policies, along
with poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and literacy tests, became
means for white supremacists to "socially and politically ex-
clude[] [African Americans] from full participation in the life of
the nation."4 1 Even more dangerously, felon disenfranchise-
ment provisions enacted to comprehensively bar black Ameri-
cans from the ballot box were facially legal-both the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments explicitly allow for the
disenfranchisement of felons.4 2 Indeed, while most Jim Crow
laws were ultimately found to be unconstitutional, covertly
racialized felon disenfranchisement laws were and still con-
tinue to be held constitutional by courts.4 3
This is not to say that felon disenfranchisement laws
stayed static per se. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s
placed particular emphasis on the right to vote as a means of
39 See CHUNG, supra note 9, at 3 (citing Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and
the Disappearing Voters, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MASS IMPRISONMENT 50-58 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
40 2 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION OF VIRGINIA 3076 (1906) [hereinafter VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGS] (statement of Dele-
gate Carter Glass).
41 Brooks, supra note 33, at 857; see Hench, supra note 36, at 733-37.
42 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States . . . ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2
("But when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied . . . or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of repre-
sentation therein shall be reduced . . . .").
43 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elec., 360 U.S. 45, 51-53
(1959) (listing a previous criminal record in a list of factors states may consider
when determining voter qualifications); Green v. Bd. of Elec. of N.Y.C., 380 F.2d
445, 449 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that disenfranchisement was not a punishment,
but rather "a nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the franchise"). See
generally Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Criminal Disenfranchisement Provisions, 10 A.L.R.6th 31 (2006) (analyzing all fed-
eral and state cases up to 2006 discussing the validity of felony disenfranchise-
ment laws). In writing the majority opinion for Green, Second Circuit Judge Henry
Friendly contended that criminals did not elect government actors that would
pass laws in their favor especially given "the heavy incidence of recidivism and the
prevalence of organized crime." Green, 380 F.2d at 451.
2019] 1687
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political participation.4 4 In response, many legislatures moved
to mitigate the effects of their felon disenfranchisement provi-
sions by either eliminating lifetime disenfranchisement or nar-
rowing the range of qualifying felonies.4 5 In spite of the shift in
public policy, courts remained staunch in their refusal to di-
rectly address the discriminatory effects of disenfranchise-
ment.
Even in cases where felon disenfranchisement provisions
were struck down, courts shied away from discussing the
racialized impact of disenfranchisement. Consider for instance
the 1970 New Jersey District Court case Stephens v. Yeoman,
which struck down the state's felon disenfranchisement stat-
ute but skirted the discussion of race entirely.46 The majority
opinion held that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause4 7 of the Fourteenth Amendment, relying on the Su-
preme Court's holding in Kramer v. Union Free School District
that disenfranchising classifications must be tailored with an
"exacting standard of precision" necessary to achieve an ar-
ticulable state goal.4 8 The court found that the statute's "hap-
hazard development" had led to "totally irrational and
inconsistent classification[s]" that could not meet the exacting
standard of precision required by the Equal Protection
Clause.4 9 Likewise, the Supreme Court of California eschewed
the opportunity to discuss the racial impact of felon disen-
44 See Abigail M. Hinchcliff, Note, The "Other" Side of Richardson v. Ramirez:
A Textual Challenge to Felon Disenfranchisement, 121 YALE L.J. 194, 203 (2011)
(describing the Civil Rights movement and its effects on voting rights law).
45 Id.
46 Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970) (striking
down N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1(2)-(5)).
47 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
.no State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The clause has been read to mandate
that, while the government may classify individuals based on group characteris-
tics, these classifications must relate to legitimate government purposes. See,
e.g., Beth A. Deverman, Fourteenth Amendment-Equal Protection: The Supreme
Court's Prohibition of Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1028, 1029 (1995) (discussing the Equal Protection Clause in the context
of J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994), a case prohibiting the exercise of
preemptory challenges based on the gender of potential jurors).
48 Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. at 1186 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.,
395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969)) ("[Tihe classifications must be tailored so that the
exclusion of appellant and members of his class is necessary to achieve the
articulated state goal. Section 2012 [of New York Education Law] does not meet
the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which selectively dis-
tribute the franchise.").
49 See Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. at 1188. For example, an individual convicted
of murder under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:4-1 would be disenfranchised, whereas an
individual convicted of attempted murder would still be eligible to vote. See id.
[Vol. 104:16791688
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franchisement laws when striking down California's disen-
franchisement law in the 1973 case Ramirez v. Brown.50
In conclusion, there was virtually zero judicial discussion
of striking down felon disenfranchisement laws on racial dis-
crimination grounds prior to Richardson v. Ramirez, in spite of
their clear roots in Jim Crow law and other antiblack policies.
And once Richardson v. Ramirez was announced, a successful
challenge to felon disenfranchisement law on racial discrimina-
tion grounds became even more improbable.
B. Richardson v. Ramirez (1974) and Subsequent Cases
Richardson v. Ramirez-decided by a divided Supreme
Court in 197151-is the most important case for any pro-disen-
franchisement defender and the largest hurdle for any disen-
franchisement reformist.52 Richardson v. Ramirez holds that
felon disenfranchisement in and of itself is constitutional
under the Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice
Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court, began his re-
view by noting that felon disenfranchisement challenges impli-
cate both the Equal Protection Clause5 3 and Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, otherwise known as the Penalty
50 Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1973), overruled by Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Rather, the California Supreme Court found that
the state's broad disenfranchisement of the state's current and previous felons
violated the equal protection clause when such disenfranchisement was not nec-
essary to achieve the state's goal of minimizing voter fraud. Ramirez, 507 P.2d at
1356-57.
51 418 U.S. 24 (1974). The Supreme Court also decided O'Brien v. Skinner in
1974, another felon voting rights case. In O'Brien, plaintiffs were jailed New York
citizens who were legally eligible to vote-they either had not been convicted of a
crime yet or else had been merely convicted of a misdemeanor. Despite their
eligibility, correctional and election officials refused to provide them with absentee
ballots, registration equipment, or transportation to the polls per the direction of
New York statutes. The Supreme Court found that the statutes were unconstitu-
tional, as they created an unconstitutionally onerous burden on the New York
citizens' ability to vote. See O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974); see also
Margaret Barthel, Getting Out the Vote From the County Jail, ATLANTIc (Nov. 4,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/1 1 /organtzers-flght-
tum-out-vote-county-jails/574783/ [https://perma.cc/5QAE-SAY9] (describing
the modern hurdles that individuals held without a felony conviction face in order
to vote).
52 Richardson v. Ramirez is still good law today, four decades later. Hinchcliff
observes "[G]iven that the Court has shown no interest in reconsidering the Rami-
rez ruling, strategies that seek to overturn the decision are likely to fail. Post-
Ramirez legal challenges to disenfranchisement have generally been unsuccess-
ful, as courts have found the topic to be a 'settled issue."' Hinchcliff, supra note
44, at 197 (footnote omitted).
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Clause.54 The Court first found that the language of the Pen-
alty Clause expressly carved out an exemption for states that
disenfranchised participants "in rebellion, or other crime."
5 5
The Court then held that the Equal Protection Clause "could
not have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchise-
ment which was expressly exempted from the less drastic sanc-
tion[s]" of the Penalty Clause.56
When Richardson v. Ramirez was decided in 1974, the ma-
jority of states had lifetime felon disenfranchisement provi-
sions.5 7 The effect of the case was to cement the
constitutionality of those bans, especially given the Supreme
Court's decision in Mobile v. Bolder.5 8 Although Mobile did not
involve felon disenfranchisement,5 9 it held that the dispropor-
tionate effects of racial discrimination alone were irrelevant to
finding a provision unconstitutional, unless there was evidence
that such discrimination was purposeful.60 The cumulative
effect of Richardson v. Ramirez and Mobile was that plaintiffs
wishing to challenge specific felon disenfranchisement provi-
sions on the grounds of racial discrimination had to prove pur-
poseful discrimination in the drafting of such provisions. That
is to say, disparate effects-no matter how shocking-would
not be enough to support a felon disenfranchisement chal-
lenge. Indeed, the nation saw such a challenge play out in
Hunter v. Underwood,6 1 which challenged section 182 of the
Alabama Constitution disenfranchising those convicted of
crimes "involving moral turpitude" as determined by the State
Attorney General.62 The Court held that section 182 was un-
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, as it not only
had a disproportionate impact on black citizens, but was
54 The relevant section of the Penalty Clause reads: "But when the right to
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of
the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial of-
ficers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2.
55 Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 42-43.
56 Id. at 55.
57 See Hinchcliff, supra note 44, at 208.
58 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
59 Mobile v. Bolden held that disproportionate discriminatory effect alone-
without evidence of purposeful discrimination-would not support a claim of
racial voting discrimination. See id.
60 See id. at 65.
61 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
62 Id. at 223.
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overtly and explicitly adopted with racially discriminatory in-
tent during the Jim Crow era.6 3
C. The Current State of U.S. Felon Disenfranchisement
Law
Today, forty-eight out of the fifty states retain some form of
felon disenfranchisement.64 Only Maine and Vermont allow
convicted populations to vote without any restriction.6 5 Al-
though the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitution-
ality of felon disenfranchisement since Richardson v. Ramirez
and Hunter, challenges to felon disenfranchisement have con-
tinued to come before the lower courts.
In particular, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)6 6 has
been carefully considered by scholars as a potential tool to
challenge felon disenfranchisement policy.67 Reformists have
not shrunk from testing the VRA's viability as a point of reform.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit heard Farrakhan v. Washing-
ton,68 which examined the constitutionality of Washington
State's felon disenfranchisement law under section 2 of the
VRA.69 Although the circuit court did not find that the law
violated the VRA, the court did use the act as a framework
63 See id. at 233 ("[We are confident that § 2 [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
was not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination attending the
enactment and operation of § 182 [of the Alabama Constitution] which otherwise
violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Andrew L. Shapiro, Chal-
lenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy,
103 YALE L.J. 537, 547 (1993) ("The plaintiffs [in Underwood] brought an action in
federal court claiming that section 182 of the Alabama Constitution, under which
they had been disenfranchised, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause because it was adopted with intent to discriminate against blacks
and was fulfilling its intended effect.").
64 CHUNG, supra note 9, at 2.
65 Id. Additionally, Maine and Vermont do not restrict the voting rights of
felons while they are serving their sentences in prison.
66 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) protects minority
communities from discriminatory voting practices by prohibiting literacy tests,
requiring non-English ballots and voting instructions, and authorizing other non-
discrimination measures. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://
www.law.comell.edu/wex/votingrights-act [https://perma.cc/5NDW-BFZK].
67 Many academics have considered how the VRA may be used to challenge
felon disenfranchisement policies. See, e.g., Matthew E. Feinberg, Suffering With-
out Suffrage: Why Felon Disenfranchisement Constitutes Vote Denial Under Section
Two of the Voting Rights Act, 8 HASTINGS RACE & POVERIY L.J. 61 (2011); Lauren
Handelsman, Giving the Barking Dog a Bite: Challenging Felon Disenfranchise-
ment Under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1875 (2005);
Thomas G. Varnum, Let's Not Jump to Conclusions: Approaching Felon Disen-
franchisement Challenges Under the Voting Rights Act, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 109
(2008).
68 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
69 See id. at 1014.
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within which to consider how the challenged law engaged with
social and historical evidence of racial bias against the state's
black voters.7 0 But not all courts have been willing to consider
striking down felon disenfranchisement policies. Consider the
Eleventh Circuit's case Johnson v. Governor of the State of Flor-
ida.7 1 There, the court essentially defanged Hunter when con-
sidering Florida's felon disenfranchisement provision by
contending that a modem revision of the original felon disen-
franchisement provision "removed the discriminatory taint"
from said original, even if the original provision had been moti-
vated by racial animus in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.72
In sum, it is unclear whether federal courts will ever in
practice strike down a felon disenfranchisement provision for
racial discrimination on either Hunter or VRA-based grounds.
As of now, no post-Hunter courts have struck down any felon
disenfranchisement provision, on any grounds. Therefore,
felon disenfranchisement reformists ought not to rely on the
courts, even post-Hunter, for relief. However, the absence of
judicial action does not mean that reform should slow, not by
any means. The deleterious effects of felon disenfranchisement
laws on America's institutions are too serious to be ignored.
This leads this Note to its next section, which contends first
that felon disenfranchisement has particularly injurious effects
on communities of color and second that the nation is ready to
remedy such effects via mass re-enfranchisement.
II
AMERICA, READY FOR FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT
REFORM?
A. Felon Disenfranchisement is a Modem Jim Crow Law
Imagine the State of Missouri. Missouri is the eighteenth-
largest state by population in the nation, with a citizenship of
70 See id. at 1016 ("As a preliminary matter, we agree with the district court
that Plaintiffs' claim of vote denial is cognizable under Section 2 of the VRA. Felon
disenfranchisement is a voting qualification, and Section 2 is clear that any voting
qualification that denies citizens the right to vote in a discriminatory manner
violates the VRA.").
71 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005).
72 Id. at 1224 ("Florida's re-enactment of the felon disenfranchisement provi-
sion in the 1968 Constitution conclusively demonstrates that the state would
enact this provision even without an impermissible motive and did enact the
provision without an impermissible motive.").
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slightly over six million.7 3 Missouri makes up nearly two per-
cent of the nation's entire population and receives eight seats
in the House of Representatives.7 4 Now, consider the numeri-
cal effect of banning Missouri's entire population from the vot-
ing booth. Consider the visual effect of removing that large of a
group from the voting pool. It should shock you.
This figure approximates the effects of felon disen-
franchisement, albeit focused in one geographical area. As of
2018, felon disenfranchisement policies remove the ability to
vote from over six million Americans across the nation-a pop-
ulation larger than that of Missouri.75 It easily constitutes the
largest population of the disenfranchised in the world.7 6 As
Angela Behrens, Christopher Uggen, and Jeff Manza note, "no
other contemporary democracy disenfranchises felons to the
same extent, or in the same manner, as the United States."7 7
Approximately one in every forty Americans within the voting-
age population has lost the right to vote-either temporarily or
permanently-by felon disenfranchisement policies.78 Over
three-quarters of the disenfranchised population are not even
physically in prison; some are on parole or probation, while
others have already completed their sentences.7 9
America's six million disenfranchised citizens is one of the
most tangible consequences pringing from the nation's mass
incarceration philosophy. The United States produce nearly a
quarter of the globe's prisoners, despite making up only five
73 Population Estimates. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217?# [https://perma.cc/9UPW-UPYE] (last
visited Nov. 9, 2018) (search "Missouri").
74 Missouri Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REvIEW (Nov. 30, 2018), http:/
/worldpopulationreview.com/states/missouri-population/ (https://perma.cc/
U8QA-VMPCI.
75 See Directory of Representatives, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://
www.house.gov/representatives [https://perma.cc/K9LY-VPPW] ("The number of
voting representatives in the House is fixed by law at no more than 435, propor-
tionally representing the population of the 50 states.") (last visited Jan. 21, 2019).
76 See Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the "Menace of Negro
Domination": Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States,
1850-2002, 109 AM. J. Soc. 559, 560 (2003).
77 Id. at 562 (citing JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United
States (1998)).
78 Elena Holodny, Millions of American Adults Are Not Allowed to Vote - And





percent of the world population,0 and the nation easily has the
highest rate of incarceration in the world."' Today, there are
2.3 million people imprisoned in the United States.8 2 Annu-
ally, approximately 650,000 of these men and women are freed
each year-many of whom are then left without the ability to
vote, despite being "restored" to their communities.8 3 In fact,
over ninety-five percent of those incarcerated will eventually be
released.8 4 No wonder then, given these statistics, there are so
many ex-felons in the United States subjected to disen-
franchisement. Moreover, although mass incarceration rates
show signs of declining, albeit slightly, researchers expect the
number of ex-felons to increase as individuals are released.
However, even more problematic is the stark racialization of
mass incarceration, and hence the same racialization of felon
disenfranchisement. Certainly, felon disenfranchisement poli-
cies are race-neutral on their face. But their effects are far from
neutral.
In order to fully comprehend the disparate effects of felon
disenfranchisement law on nonwhite communities, it behooves
us to first look at statistics illustrating the way in which mass
incarceration unduly affects nonwhite individuals. There has
been much academic discussion of racism in the American
imprisonment scheme.8 5 Michelle Alexander writes:
80 See Mass Incarceration, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-jus
tice/mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/Z8H7-ZKZK] (last visited Aug. 9,
2019).
81 See DEvAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRImE, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 22 (2007) (examining the impact of mass incarceration on ex-
felons).
82 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018,
PRISON POLICY (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2O18.
html [https://perma.cc/3TEQ-59YU].
83 Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.jus
tice.gov/archive/fbci/progmenu-reentry.html [https://perma.cc/2DND-9SEG]
(last visited Aug. 9, 2019).
84 Timothy Hughes & Doris James Wilson, Reentry Trends in the United
States, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.bjs.gov/con-
tent/reentry/reentry.cfm [https://perma.cc/R5NR-AVM7] (reflecting that at least
95% of all state prisoners will be released from prison at some point); see also
PAGER, supra note 81, at 22 ("Apart from the small number of offenders impris-
oned for life, the vast majority are released back into the community after a few
years of confinement.")
85 See, e.g., Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racisr Racial Stratification and
Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1023 (2010) (contending
that election of Barack Obama did not necessarily translate to a shift in racial
attitudes within the context of mass incarceration); Michael O'Hear, Mass Incar-
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No other country in the world imprisons so many of its racial
or ethnic minorities. The United States imprisons a larger
percentage of its black population than South Africa did at
the height of apartheid. In Washington, D.C., . . . three out of
four young black men (and nearly all those in the poorest
neighborhoods) can expect to serve time in prison. Similar
rates of incarceration can be found in black communities
across America.8 6
There is overwhelming evidence that black- and Latinx-identi-
fied individuals are disparately represented in prison popula-
tions.87 The 2010 Census found that black Americans were
five times more likely to be incarcerated than their white coun-
terparts."" Indeed, while black Americans comprise around
thirteen percent of the nation's overall population, they make
up a shocking forty percent of the federal and state prison
population.8 9 Compare this statistic to parallel figures for
white Americans. White Americans comprise approximately
sixty-four percent of the nation's overall population but make
up a mere thirty percent of the same federal and state prison
population.9 0 Black men are incarcerated at a rate of 4,340 per
100,000 Americans.9 1 Black women are incarcerated at a rate
of 260 per 100,000 Americans.92 These figures average out to
approximately 2,303 black individuals incarcerated per
Wisconsin's prison system in light of the "spatial inequality of incarceration"
appearing in main cities, such as Milwaukee); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Mass
Incarceration ofAfi-can-American Males: A Return to Institutionalized Slavery, Op-
pression, and Disenfranchisement of Constitutional Rights, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REv. 559 (2007) (exploring how the mass incarceration of black men is a modem
reconception of involuntary servitude).
86 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 6-7 (rev. ed. 2012).
87 See Sarah K.S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution
of People with Felony Records in the United States, 1948-2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY
1795, 1796-99 (2017); see, e.g., Weatherspoon, supra note 85; PAGER, supra note
81; ALEXANDER, supra note 86 (discussing the effects of mass incarceration on
black communities and the way in which "colorblindness" minimizes such
effects).
88 Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the 2010 Census: State-
by-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POL'Y (May 28, 2014),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html [https://perma.cc/8HJF-
XQwN.
89 Id.; see also Drew Kann, 5 Facts Behind America's High Incarceration Rate,
CNN (July 10, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/mass-incarcera
tion-five-key-facts/index.html [https://perma.ce/T9XH-PHCV] (reporting similar
figures).
90 Sakala, supra note 88.






100,000 Americans.9 3 This trend is historically grounded;
black imprisonment rates have exceeded white rates at least
since the Civil War, if not for far longer.9 4
Latinx- and Afro-Latinx identifying people face similar
treatment from the America criminal justice system. According
to the 2010 Census, Latinx people are twice as likely to be
incarcerated as whites. Although they make up sixteen per-
cent of the population, they constitute nearly twenty percent of
the U.S. incarcerated population. Moreover, Latinx individuals
face a starkly increased likelihood of drug conviction. A shock-
ing majority of persons convicted of federal marijuana crimes
identify as Latinx, making up seventy-seven percent of mari-
juana sentences, despite constituting less than twenty percent
the nation's population.9 5 Thus, we conclude that mass incar-
ceration is critically racialized, in a way that unfairly and dis-
parately affects black and Latinx-identified citizens.
The data on felony convictions shows a similarly problem-
atic trend. A study9 6 conducted by sociology professors across
the United States found that black persons in particular are
disparately affected by felony conviction.
By 2010, all but one state (Maine) had a felony conviction rate
of at least 5 % of adult African Americans. . . . Most strik-
ingly, rates in five states exceeded 20 %, meaning that one in
five African American adults in these states had at some
point been under felony supervision (California, Florida, Indi-
ana, Massachusetts, and Washington).... Where state rates
are higher, a greater share of the population will be subject to
the formal and informal collateral consequences of felony
conviction... . These discriminatory effects are amplified for
African American communities . . .97
The statistics regarding both mass incarceration and felony
conviction unequivocally demonstrate the racialized nature of
the criminal justice system.
The consequences of disparate treatment of nonwhite-
and especially black-individuals at the conviction and impris-
onment stages unsurprisingly results in parallel results post-
93 Sakala, supra note 88.
94 Behrens et al., supra note 76, at 560.
95 Steven Nelson, Latinos Got 77 Percent of Federal Pot Sentences Last Year,
U.S. NEWS (Mar. 15, 2017), [https://perma.cc/T9TW-EHLK. Nelson also notes
that about eighty percent of crack cocaine sentences have African American
defendants.
96 Shannon et al., supra note 87, at 1811.
97 Id. at 1811-12. This Note recognizes that Shannon et al. were unable to
provide estimates for Latinx people and felony convictions, as there were signifi-
cant gaps within criminal justice data series for such individuals.
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conviction. According to the Sentencing Project, one in every
thirteen adult black citizens is affected by felony disen-
franchisement laws.98 This is four times the rate at which
nonblack persons are disenfranchised.9 9 Behrens, Uggens,
and Manza conducted an empirical study in 2003 noting the
relationship between "racial threat," or white anxieties that
nonwhite voters would achieve politically parity, and the con-
tinued existence of felon disenfranchisement laws. 100
In considering political parity, it is important to keep focus
on the fundamental importance of the right to vote. That is,
when nonwhite individuals are barred from the vote, they have
diminished electoral power that affects their ability to engage
with and influence state and national legislation. Behrens,
Uggen, and Manza comment that "disenfranchisement rates
can affect elections by diminishing the electoral power of mi-
nority groups, the results of which affect a state's-and the
nation's-" electorate, political movement, and legislation as a
whole.101 Moreover, they note that states with higher rates of
imprisoned citizens have lower access and quality of health
care for all citizens.10 2 There is a similar detrimental effect that
occurs on a more microscale within individual communities.
Giovanna Shay notes the long-term effect of disenfranchise-
ment on these communities beyond the loss of voting rights to
individual felons:
Disenfranchisement is not the only way that mass incarcera-
tion reduces the political power of poor communities; be-
cause the incarcerated are counted as residents in the
jurisdictions where they are imprisoned for the purposes of
legislative reapportionment, their home districts lose political
influence.103
Moreover, felon disenfranchisement contributes to the psy-
chological effects of incarceration that push ex-felons towards
recidivism. There is extensive research indicating that ex-
felons who receive strong community support and who can re-
enter society with employment and social ties are less likely to
98 CHUNG, supra note 9, at 2.
99 See id. ("Black Americans of voting age are more than four times more
likely to lose their voting rights than the rest of the adult population. .").
100 See Behrens et al., supra note 76, at 598.
101 See Shannon et al., supra note 87, at 1811.
102 Id.




re-engage in criminal activities.1 0 4 Consequences of a felony
conviction can contribute to stigmatization that cuts against an
ex-felon's ability to fully re-enter society.0 5 Guy Padraic Ham-
ilton-Smith and Matt Vogel assert that "[miany individuals who
are subject to disenfranchisement laws speak of disen-
franchisement as a symbol that they do not belong, and that
they are outsiders in their own community."'0 6
In conclusion, felon disenfranchisement laws have a long
and storied history rooted in racism, that today manifests itself
in disparate and dangerous consequences for nonwhite ex-
felons. In particular, black and Latinx Americans are subject
to political inequity and increased bars to re-entering society.
B. Americans Support Felon Disenfranchisement Reform
This Note moves to argue that, despite the ubiquity of felon
disenfranchisement provisions across the states, there is ro-
bust evidence-both empirical and sociological-indicating
that the American public is overwhelmingly in favor of mitigat-
ing, if not abolishing, felon disenfranchisement entirely.
Consider first that felon disenfranchisement laws have un-
dergone substantial modification in recent years. Since 1997,
twenty-four states have made mitigating changes to their fel-
ony disenfranchisement laws.10 7 In 1997, Texas repealed the
two-year waiting period for ex-felons to have their rights
restored.0 s Between 2000 and 2010, Delaware, Maryland, Ne-
braska, and New Mexico repealed their lifetime disenfranchise-
ment provisions, replacing them with less harsh
alternatives.0 9 And in November 2018, Florida restored the
right of one million ex-felons to vote by amending the Florida
104 See, e.g., JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISEN-
FRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006); Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith &
Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchise-
ment on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 407 (2012); Nancy Leong, Allowing
Felons to Vote Could Prevent Crime, TAKE CARE (July 27, 2017), https://takecare
blog.com/blog/allowing-felons-to-vote-could-prevent-crime [https://perma.cc/
U3M4-NCBS].
105 Hamilton-Smith & Vogel, supra note 104, at 408 ("A frequently-made argu-
ment made against disenfranchisement is that it further isolates and segregates
ex-felons re-entering into society by denying them the ability to participate in the
political process. This isolation and segregation, in turn, is counterproductive to
the rehabilitative ideals of the criminal justice system. If, arguendo, the primary
goal of the American criminal justice system is to reduce crime, then policies that
result in increased crime rates make little sense." (footnote omitted)).
106 Id. at 414.
107 See CHUNG, supra note 9, at 4-6.
108 Id. at 5.
109 ICL
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constitution to re-enfranchise those who "complete all terms of
their sentence including parole or probation.""10 These
changes have led to an estimated 1,840,000 citizens being re-
enfranchised.111
This Note contends that increased mitigation to felon dis-
enfranchisement laws directly reflects the American public's
shift in favor towards re-enfranchising felons and ex-felons. A
study conducted by Uggen, Manza, and Behrans found via a
recent national poll that eighty percent of Americans favor re-
storing voting rights to former felons and that sixty percent of
Americans favor restoring voting rights to current individuals
on probation or parole.112 Manza, Uggen, and Clem Brooks, in
a separate article, describe how, over time, a "civil liberties
view" has developed within the American public that "prevails
over a punitive view that would deny political rights to nonin-
carcerated felons."" 3 Manza, Uggen, and Brooks continue:
For all categories of felons who are not currently in prison,
relatively large majorities . . . favor enfranchisement. Addi-
tionally, we find evidence that between 60 and 68 percent of
the public believes that felony probationers ... should have
their voting rights restored. Moreover, 60 percent support
voting rights for parolees . .. and 66 percent support voting
rights for even ex-felons convicted of a violent crime who have
served their entire sentence. 114
What is the reason for the public's warming towards felon dis-
enfranchisement reform? This Note proffers several arguments.
Firstly, empirical evidence indicates that there is increased
public attention towards civil rights and race issues. According
to Gallup, the number of Americans who "worry a 'great deal'
about race relations" has gone from seventeen percent to forty-
two percent between 2014 and 2017.11 According to Gallup
polls:
110 See Olivia B. Waxman, As Florida Restores Ex-Felons' Right to Vote, Here's
the Dark History Behind Their Disenfranchisement, TIME (Nov. 8, 2018), http://
time.com/5448284/ex-felon-voting-rights-amendment-4-history-disenfranchise
ment/ [https://perma.cc/H85Z-FKFB] (citing the text of the Voter Restoration
Amendment).
111 See Holodny, supra note 78.
112 See Christopher Uggen et al., Felony Voting Rights and the Disenfranchise-
ment of African Americans, 5 SouLs 48, 55 (2003).
113 Jeff Manza et al., supra note 13, at 283.
114 Id.
115 Art Swift, Americans' Worries About Race Relations at Record High, GALLUP




Race relations or racism has emerged as one of the top issues
on Gallup's most important problem list, rising from 1% to
3% of Americans mentioning the issue throughout much of
2014 to 18% doing so in July 2016 after incidents of violence
between police and black men . ... Mentions of this issue
have stayed at a monthly average of 9% since then." 6
Consider also the increased attention given to individual
voting habits, as galvanized by the elections of the last two
decades. Recent years have been characterized by a series of
tightly-contested United States elections.'1 7 In 2000, the pres-
idential election between Republic George W. Bush and Demo-
crat Al Gore was incredibly close. " I" The state that swung the
vote to Bush was Florida, which had and continues to have
extremely restrictive felon voting provisions."1 9 Many scholars,
including Manza and Uggen, contend that "[i]f disenfranchised
felons in Florida had been permitted to vote, Democrat [presi-
dential-candidatel Gore would certainly have carried the state,
and the election."' 20 Manza and Uggen also point to disen-
franchisement's possible influence on past elections, stating
that it would be likely that "some closely contested Democratic
political victories of the recent past might have gone to the
Republicans had contemporary rates of disenfranchisement
prevailed at the time."'21 The modem emphasis and approach
towards voting and civic duty implicitly shines a light on who is
able to vote and who is not, especially when un-incarcerated
parolees and ex-convicts are barred from voting, despite being
otherwise functioning members of society. This Note acknowl-
edges that there likely are other factors contributing to the
nation's attitudes to re-enfranchisement. Suffice to say, how-
ever, there has been a substantial increase in felon disen-
franchisement reform in recent years.
116 Id.
117 Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Conse-
quences of Felon Disenfranchisement i  the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 777,
779 (2002).
118 Id. at 792.
119 See id. ("[There are more disenfranchised felons in Florida, approximately
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III
THE PROBLEM WITH REFORM VIA GUBERNATORIAL
EXECUTIVE ORDER
Much of modem felon disenfranchisement reform has
taken place via state executive action. More specifically,
through state governors' executive action and pardon pow-
ers.12 2 For example, Governor Cuomo-in response to the New
York legislature's failure to re-enfranchise state felons-an-
nounced that New York felons would be extended the right to
vote once they completed their sentence.12 3 This order allowed
New York felons on parole to vote. No doubt there is much to
admire about the governors who have used their offices' powers
to re-enfranchise state felons. Supporters of Virginia ex-gover-
nor Terry McAuliffe's 2016 blanket executive order re-en-
franchising Virginia felons lauded him for embodying "the
powerful leadership needed across the nation to combat ves-
tiges of de jure racial discrimination and recent retrenchment
on voting rights."12 4
This Note asserts, however, that significant complications
emerge when governors exercise unilateral authority to re-en-
franchise felons. In order to illustrate this, the following sec-
tion closely interrogates McAuliffe's executive order and the
political drama that subsequently ensued. This case study
concludes that, while McAuliffe achieved short-term felon dis-
enfranchisement reform, it impaired the ability of Virginia's
state governance to encourage political efficacy and bipartisan-
ship. Moreover, McAuliffe's executive order was a mere band-
aid skirting the actual issues of race and marginalization en-
trenched within the state's felon disenfranchisement provision.
A. Case Study: The McAuliffe Executive Order (2016)
Terry McAuliffel 25 is a staunch figure within the Demo-
cratic establishment. An established party candidate and close
122 See Sam Levine, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo Is Restoring Voting Rights
to Felons on Parole, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost
.com/entry/andrew-cuomo-new-york-voting-rights-parole us_5ad76d92e4bOe4
d0715c9a63 [https://perma.cc/ZVY4-VYU2]; see also supra INTRODUCTION (dis-
cussing voting restoration efforts by governors in Iowa and Kentucky).
123 See Levine, supra note 122.
124 Janal S. Nelson, Felon Disenfranchisement Is Anti-Democratic, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2016, 7:24 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/04/
22 /should-felons-ever-be-allowed-to-vote/felon-disenfranchisement-is-anti-
democratic [https://perma.cc/KZH8-9WHP].
125 McAuliffe would serve as governor from 2014 to 2018, at which time he was
succeeded by fellow Democrat Ralph Northam.
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friend of Bill and Hillary Rodham Clinton, he was narrowly
elected the seventy-second governor of Virginia in 2013.126 At
the time of McAuliffe's election, Virginia-like the aforemen-
tioned states of Kentucky, Iowa, and Florida-maintained
highly-punitive lifetime felon disenfranchisement policies.
Furthermore, the state had one of the nation's highest levels of
disenfranchisement: 7.3 percent of the state's population could
not vote in 2010.127 Unsurprisingly, Virginia's disenfranchise-
ment policies have strong ties to Jim Crow legislation.1 2 8 Prior
to McAuliffe's election, his predecessors, both Democrat and
Republican, spent significant effort mitigating the state's felon
126 See Trip Gabriel, Terry McAuliffe, Democrat, Is Elected Governor of Virginia
in Tight Race, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/
us/politics/mcauliffe-is-elected-governor-in-virginia.html [https://perma.cc/
AL96-MS2P].
127 See Danielle Kurtzleben, Virginia's Governor Just Gave 206,000 People the
Right to Vote, NPR (Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/22/475
297932/virginias-governor-just-gave-206-000-ex-felons-the-right-to-vote
[https://perma.cc/2UGT-A9CC].
128 In 1902, in trend with the neighboring Southern states, Virginia repealed
its previous constitution, which placed very little restrictions on the electorate,
and replaced it with a far more restrictive document. This document was explic-
itly intended to politically disenfranchise black citizens; the president of the con-
stitutional convention and a former Confederate colonel, John Goode, contended
that black citizens "had no capacity to participate in the functions of government."
Matt Ford, The Racist Roots of Virginia's Felon Disenfranchisement, ATLANTIC (Apr.
27, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/virginia-
felon-disenfranchisement/480072/ [https://perma.cc/LD96-7X8U]. Virginia
delegate R.L. Gordon stated, "I told the people of my county before they sent me
here that I intended, as far as in me lay, to disenfranchise every negro that I could
disenfranchise under the Constitution of the United States, and as few white
people as possible." Id. Virginia delegate Carter Glass argued that felony disen-
franchisement laws would "eliminate the darkey as a political factor in this State
in less than five years, so that in no single county . . . will there be the least
concern felt for the complete supremacy of the white race in the affairs of govern-
ment." VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGs, supra note 40, at 3076; see also Dale E. Ho, Virginia
Needs to Fix Its Racist Voting Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2016), https://www
.nythmes.com/2016/07/19/opinion/virginia-needs-to-fix-its-racist-voting-law
.html [https://perma.cc/XJD2-MYJQI ("They were not shy about their intentions.
Virginia's new constitution would 'eliminate the darkey as a political factor,' ex-
plained [Delegate] Carter Glass . . . ."). As these quotes suggest, Virginia's dele-
gates-much like their counterparts in the other Southern states-used the
"racial imbalances in the state's criminal-justice system" to tailor their disen-
franchisement laws to crimes they thought would affect black voters: "treason . . .
any felony, bribery, petit larceny, obtaining money or property under false pre-
tenses, embezzlement, forgery, or perjury." Ford, supra. This, combined with
literacy tests and poll taxes, affected Virginia's black voters profoundly: "By the
end of 1902, determined registrars and literacy tests had eliminated all but
21,000 of an estimated 147,000 blacks of voting age from the registration lists;
three years later, the new poll tax cut that number in half." J. DOUGLAS SMITH,
MANAGING WHITE SUPREMACY: RACE, POLITICS, AND CITIZENSHIP IN JIM CROW VIRGINIA 26
(2002).
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disenfranchisement provision.129 Former Virginia governor
Tim Kaine re-enfranchised over 4,400 felons between 2006 and
2010, and-towards the end of his term-conducted substan-
tial research towards the possibility of granting a blanket resto-
ration of felon voting rights.o3 0 In 2010, Kaine's successor,
Republican Robert F. McDonnell, removed the application pro-
cess for individuals convicted of nonviolent felonies to have
their rights restored and eliminated the two-year waiting period
for restoration, in line with his campaign promise to re-en-
franchise more felons than any other governor in Virginian
history.' 3 In 2013, McDonnell also proposed an amendment
to the Virginia Constitution to automatically restore voting
rights to nonviolent felons. 132 Although this proposal was
killed by the state's House of Delegates, McDonnell managed to
restore voting rights to over 5,000 nonviolent ex-offenders and
former felons over his four-year term as governor.13 3
Thus, it was not entirely unprecedented when, in April
2016, McAuliffe issued an aggressive and comprehensive exec-
utive order calling for the categorical pardon of all Virginia ex-
felons and a blanket restoration of ex-felon political rights. '3
McAuliffe's order relied on the powers enumerated in article V,
section 12 of the Virginia Constitution stating:
129 See Errin Whack, Va. Ramps Up Restoration of Voting Rights for Some Ex-




130 See Letter from Mark E. Rubin, Counselor to the Governor, to Kent Willis,
American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia 1 (Jan. 15, 2010).
131 See Errin Haines, Virginia's McDonnell on Pace to Restore Voting Rights to





132 See Josh Israel, Virginia Governor Automatically Restores Voting Rights to
Nonviolent Felons, THINK PROGRESS (May 29, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/
virginia-governor-automatically-restores-voting-rights-to-nonviolent-felons-
bfa4baa3ce5a/ [https://perma.cc/2DNU-DSTM].
133 See Whack, supra note 129.
134 See Alexander Pringle, Comment, The Limits of Executive Clemency: How
the Virginia Supreme Court Blocked the Restoration of Felons' Political Rights in
Howell v. McAuliffe, 37 B.C. J.L. & Soc. JUST. 61, 61-62 (2016); see also Civil
Rights Groups File Amicus Brief in Virginia Restoration of Voting Rights Case,
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (June 28, 2016) https://advancementproject.org/news/
civil-rights-groups-file-amicus-brief-in-virginia-restoration-of-voting-rights-case/
[https://perma.cc/SCS7-YQ34] (discussing Virginia's felon disenfranchisement
policies prior to the McAuliffe executive action).
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The Governor shall have power . . . to grant reprieves and
pardons after conviction except when the prosecution has
been carried on by the House of Delegates; [and] to remove
political disabilities consequent upon conviction for offenses
committed prior or subsequent to the adoption of this
Constitution. 135
However, this was the first time in Virginia's history that a
governor attempted to use the state's pardon power "on a cate-
gorical basis."136 The order immediately generated statewide
excitement. Supporters of the order applauded McAuliffe for
openly denouncing felon disenfranchisement's disproportion-
ate effects on black Virginians.137 Detractors from the order
responded that the order was motivated by McAuliffe's desire to
exploit the Democratic "felon vote" for then-Democratic presi-
dential nominee Hillary Clinton.13 8 CNN reporter Kayleigh
McEnany noted:
Adding .. . extra voters could most certainly make the differ-
ence in a state with just over 5 million registered voters. As
Politico reports, as of June 30, just 8,170 convicted felons
have taken the step of registering to vote, and these voters
tend to lean Democratic. This addition of new voters, how-
ever minute, could very well make a difference. As most re-
call, the 2000 election in Florida was determined by just a
few hundred votes, suggesting that the addition of thousands
of new voters could have a determinative effect on the electo-
ral outcome this fall. 139
Others resisted McAuliffe's argument that re-enfranchising
felons was necessary to address the racist after-effects of Vir-
135 VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Erik Eckholm,
Virginia Governor Restores Voting Rights to Felons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/23/us/govemor-terry-mcauliffe-virginia-
voting-rights-convicted-felons.html [https://perma.ce/36M3-VBHJ] (discussing
McAuliffe's use of executive power to restore voting rights by "effectively over-
turn[ing a Civil War-era provision in the state's Constitution aimed ... at disen-
franchising African-Americans").
136 L. Michael Berman, Comment, Howell v. McAuliffe, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 251,
267 (2017), (citing Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016)).
137 Graham Moomaw, Republicans Plan to Sue McAuliffe Over Order Restoring
Rights to Felons, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (May 2, 2016), http://www.richmond
.com/news/virginia/government-politics/article_6fl 7684a-2425-5b3c-a3b9-
2aa9c3d4670a.html [https://perma.cc/5KP5-P2JTI.
138 See, e.g., Cal Thomas, The Felon Vote, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2016), https:/
/www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/25/cal-thomas-the-felon-vote-in-
virginia/ [https://perma.cc/H7C7-M7JKI.
139 Kayleigh McEnany, The Court Case That Could Decide the 2016 Election,
CNN (July 18, 2016) http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/18/opinions/howell-v-mc
auliffe-virginia-election-case-mcenany/index.html [https://perma.ce/XFD5-
47BT).
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ginia's Jim Crow laws. A scathing opinion piece in the Wash-
ington Post lambasted McAuliffe for forcing protesters of the
executive order "to run a phony . .. racial gauntlet."140
The McAuliffe executive order provoked a strong political
backlash from the state's Republican-led legislature. The Re-
publican Speaker of the House, William J. Howell, and the
Republican Majority Leader of the Senate, Thomas Norment,
Jr., quickly mobilized to file a lawsuit seeking writs of manda-
mus and prohibition against McAuliffe's categorical pardon.141
After much public tension and debate, the Virginia Su-
preme Court struck down the McAuliffe order in the case of
HoweU v. McAuliffe.14 2 The court asserted that sweeping re-
enfranchisement was an unconstitutional use of the executive
branch's clemency power. 1 43 The Court's holding was an
empty victory, however, for McAuliffe's opponents. Mere
months after the Court's decision, McAuliffe-amidst severe
backlash from Virginia republicans-successfully implemented
an alternative re-enfranchisement process that individually re-
stored the thousands of Virginia felons.14 4 McAuliffe described
his office's aggressive restoration of felon voting rights as "an
issue of basic justice," stating:
I personally believe in the power of second chances in the
dignity and worth of a single human being .... These [disen-
franchised felons] are gainfully employed. They send their
children and their grandchildren to our schools. They shop
at our grocery stores and they pay taxes. And I am not con-
tent to condemn them for eternity as inferior, second-class
citizens.145
140 Norman Leahy & Paul Goldman, Let's Take Race Out of the Felon Voting
Rights Issue, WASH. POST (May 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/all-opinions-are-local/wp/2016/05/17/lets-take-race-out-of-the-felon-
voting-rights-issue/?utmterm=.c6a2dadl499b [https://perma.cc/4A2J-WDK8].
141 See Pringle, supra note 134, at 62; see also Verified Petition for Writs of
Mandanus and Prohibition and Memorandum in Support of Verified Petition, BREN-
NAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (May 23, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/de-
fault/ffiles/analysis/Howell%20v0/2OMcAuliffe%20-%2OPetition.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/LJ2P-J6D4].
142 Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016).
143 See Pringle, supra note 134, at 64-65.
144 Laura Vozzella, Virginia's McAuliffe to Announce Restoration of Voting





145 Laura Vozzella, McAuliffe Restores Voting Rights to 13,000 Felons, WASH.




This process undoubtedly mitigated some of the racial effects of
Virginia's felon disenfranchisement policies.1
4 6 Forty-five
percent of those affected by McAuliffe's orders were African
American.147 Certainly, McAuliffe's acts to halt felon disen-
franchisement was effective. And for that, McAuliffe and all
other executive actors following in his footsteps are admirable.
Truly, this Note does not mean to critique their intentions or
detract in any way from the importance of their work. However,
the remainder of this section contends that-while McAuliffe
ultimately realized his goal of broadly restoring felon rights-
his executive action came at substantial cost to the political
and social legitimacy of Virginia's governorship, as well as to
the working relationship between the state's executive and leg-
islative branches.
B. Lessons from the McAuliffe Executive Order
1. Political Efficacy
This section applies principles of political efficacy and con-
sent theory to the events surrounding McAuliffe's executive
order to demonstrate that the executive order came at signifi-
cant cost to McAuliffe's political legitimacy. Firstly, this section
engages with a brief discussion of political efficacy and consent
theory as they relate to this Note's argument. Then, this Note
will move to applying it to McAuliffe's executive order.
There has been extensive research and commentary on the
relationship between the public conception of government le-
gitimacy and executive branch actions on both state and fed-
eral levels. Legitimacy, in the context of political science, is the
public's belief that an institution has a founded right to govern
society at large.'4 3 Such trust "produces distinctive collective
11e6-99bf-fOcf3a6449a6_story.html?utm term=.a57f7736cf6d [https://perma
.cc/7C2N-BQNU].
146 Norman Leahy & Paul Goldman, It's McAuliffe's Choice on Individual Rights




147 Stolberg & Eckholm, supra note 135.
148 See Ian Hurd, Legitimacy, ENCYCLOPEDIA PRINCETONIESIS (2007) https://
pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/255 [https://perma.cc/W9NR-YKZT]; Fabienne Pe-
ter, Political Legitimacy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2017) https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/ [https://perma.cc/PM2A-PA32] ("Accord-
ing to [Max] Weber, that a political regime is legitimate means its participants
have certain beliefs or faith . ... In contrast to Weber's descriptive concept, the
normative concept of political legitimacy refers to some ... justification of political
power or authority . . . .")
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effects in society, including making collective social order more
efficient, more consensual, and perhaps more just."1 4 9 The
broad concept of this "trust" reappears in academic consent
theory, which follows the basic premise that the legitimization
of political authority necessitates the consent of the
governed. 150
Inquiry into a government's legitimacy and whether such
government has the consent of its citizens fundamentally en-
gages with the tide of public opinion. James Stinson advances
the thesis that while static public opinion does not usually have
great power over government, a change in public opinion criti-
cally affects government and its actors.151 Moreover, such
changes do not require large numbers of the public to engage
politically; he writes, "Great movements to left or right, to Dem-
ocrat or Republican, or to approval or disapproval are produced
by the systematic change of a quite small number of people."152
Public opinion surrounding executive action fluctuates based
on two principals, according to Eileen Braman.153 That is to
say, individuals determining the legitimacy of an executive ac-
tion rely on two factors-one objective and one subjective.
Firstly, citizens consider whether an executive action ob-
jectively complies with the U.S. Constitution or with procedure.
Secondly, citizens consider their prior subjective satisfaction
with the executive actor at hand. Braman concludes that:
149 See Hurd, supra note 148.
150 See Peter, supra note 148 (discussing consent as one potential source of
political legitimacy).
151 See JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: How PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES AMERI-
CAN POLrcs 158 (2004).
152 Id. at 158-59. This is not to say that public opinion is necessarily the
ultimate arbiter of an executive action's legitimacy. Many times, federal executive
action has been used to merely bring media attention to subjects outside of the
legislature's focus. SUSAN PRICE, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, EXECUTIVE OR-
DERS AND SEPARATION OF POWERS (2005) https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-
R-0579.htm [https://perma.cc/4BDZ-A4ED]. And in some cases, executive ac-
tion that at first is challenged by public outrage is later lauded for its effects. For
instance, President Grover Cleveland's decision to preserve forest reserves in Col-
orado was initially castigated as federal overreach. His action was denounced as
"arbitrary" and a "menace to the interests of the Western States." John D. Leshy,
Shaping the Modem West: The Role of the Executive Branch, 72 U. COLO. L. REV.
287, 289 (2001). Yet later, much scholarship contends that "[w]ithout ... bold
executive actions, the federal lands would probably be much diminished in both
size and quality today." Id. at 291.
153 Eileen Braman, Exploring Citizen Assessments of Unilateral Executive Au-
thority, 50 L. & Soc. REv. 189, 220 (2016). While Braman's research sits within a
federal context-the executive officer at hand in the study was President Barack
Obama-it is not unreasonable for this Note to apply the same concepts to the




[Wihile individuals may be willing to extend latitude to presi-
dents they like and/or legislative actions they agree with in
judging the appropriateness of government deeds, that lati-
tude is not unlimited. It is bound by conceptions of appropri-
ate behavior across the different branches of government.
Clearly, citizens pay very close attention to whether govern-
ment actors are following prescribed rules in evaluating the
legitimacy of state action. 154
A baseline understanding of political efficacy and consent the-
ory gives this Note context within which to understand how
McAuliffe's executive order affected his office's legitimacy. The
crux of this section's argument is that McAuliffe's executive
order damaged the legitimacy and credibility of his governor-
ship by swaying public opinion beyond the "appropriate" lati-
tude, to use Braman's terminology.1 5 5
Following Howell v. McAuliffe, 15 6 polls from the Washing-
ton Post reflect division over what the Virginia public believed
were McAuliffe's motivations for issuing the executive order.1 5 7
Forty-five percent of the state believed that McAuliffe was moti-
vated out of his own altruism, while forty-two percent of the
state believed that McAuliffe was motivated because he wanted
to help Democrats with elections.1 5 8 There is significant disso-
nance between these two motivations and Braman's factors.
That is to say, Virginians believed that McAuliffe was acting
based on his administration's interests-not he objective fac-
tor of procedure or constitutionality. In Braman's model, this
cuts against a finding of legitimacy.
Consider next Braman's second factor, subjective prior
satisfaction. The findings of the Washington Post were highly
partisan. Over seven in ten Republicans stated that McAuliffe
wanted to boost his party's voting pool while, similarly, over
seven in ten Democrats stated the opposite.159 At best, this
factor appears neutral. However, this assumes that governor-
ship baseline satisfaction levels run along party lines. In actu-
ality, McAuliffe's approval ratings were not only weaker, but far
154 Id. at 219-20.
155 Id. at 189-92.
156 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016).
157 See Laura Vozzella et al., Majority of Virginians Approve of Terry McAulffe,
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more partisan, than Virtually all of Virginia's past governors
over the past two decades.1 60 For McAuliffe to buck Virginia's
established approval trends suggests that-like Stinson dis-
cusses-the tide of public opinion stemming from the drama of
his executive order has had an effect on McAuliffe's individual
legitimacy before the Virginian public.
In light of McAuliffe's potential presidential bid in 2020,
further research may want to consider whether Howell v. McAu-
liffe affects the way in which his campaign engages with parti-
san lines across the states.1 6 1 McAuliffe's approval among
registered voters was seventy-seven percent for Democrats,
fifty-three for independents, and twenty-seven percent for
Republicans. The fifty-point spread between the Democrats
and Republicans is larger than the gaps for the previous four
governors.16 2 The Washington Post notes that "[only [then-
President] Qbama has ratings that are more polarized along
partisan lines than McAuliffe's."163 Julian Zelizer, a professor
of history and public affairs at Princeton University, hypothe-
sizes that "there is too much Clinton" in McAuliffe for a suc-
cessful presidential bid and argues that "he doesn't have the
kind of fire power on the campaign trail people will need to
really rally the base."16 4 On the other hand, however, perhaps
McAuliffe's executive action will benefit his ability to engage
with progressives outside of the establishment.165 Jennifer
Duffy of the Cook Political Report notes, "In 2016, [the Demo-
cratic Party] nominated a well-known, establishment candidate
and that didn't go so well .... My guess is they sort of make a
160 Id. Fifty-three percent of voters approve of McAuliffe, according to a new
Washington Post poll, and thirty-three percent disapprove. Id.
161 McAuliffe's intent to run for the presidency in 2020 "is widely assumed
around Richmond" and he has since been traveling around the country in an
effort to bolster the Democratic Party's status and assist in his fellow party mem-
bers' elections. Gregory Schneider, McAuliffe May Be on His Way Out in Va., But
Nationally He's Just Arriving, WASH. PosT (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/terry-mcauliffe-may-be-on-his-way-out-in-
va-but-nationally-hes-Just-arriving/20 17/11/12 /a94034ec-c58c- 11 e7-afe9-
4f6Ob5a6c4aO-story.html?noredirect=on&utmterm=. Oc 1 7baae5897 [https://
perma.cc/BY9A-9URA]. This is perhaps most evident in his campaigning for his
successor, Ralph Northam, who won by nearly nine percent in 2017. See Mat-
thew Bloch et al., Virginia Election Results: Nortlhan Defeats Gillespie in Governor
Race, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/
virginia-govemor-election-gillespie-northam [https://perma.cc/CZ4M-CUPG].
162 See Vozella et al., supra note 157.
163 Id.
164 Arnie Parnes, McAulffe 'Seriously' Considering 2020 Run, HILL (Nov. 30,
2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/362460-mcauliffe-seriously-
considering-2020-run [https://perma.ce/9JD-Y3G6].
165 See Schneider, supra note 161.
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180 in 2020, and the establishment Democrats may struggle.
And I think that given McAuliffe's long past in Democratic polit-
ics he'd probably fall into that category."1 6 6
In sum, an examination of public opinion following the
McAuliffe executive action through the lens of Braman's two-
factor test indicates that the public saw its issuance as a parti-
san act, rather than a legal one. Because of this, it ultimately
hurt the legitimacy of McAuliffe's administration as it gave the
impression that his administration's agenda was to roll out
personal policy agendas, rather than a more neutral, legitimate
goal.
2. Bipartisanship and Separation of Powers
Consider the concepts of bipartisanship and separation of
powers-both of which are fundamental to both state and fed-
eral government. True, founding father James Madison envi-
sioned the two as distinct and at times at odds: A Madisonian
conception of the separation of powers relies on an "invisible-
hand dynamic" to robustly constrain each branch's and each
party's powers.16 7 Over time, however, American political
trends have moved away from the Madisonian ideal towards a
more cooperative vision based on the concepts of party domi-
nance and allegiance.1 68 This sort of cooperation has become a
necessary part of American governance; in many instances,
there must be cooperation between parties to some extent in
order for legislation to pass. Scholarship has found that bipar-
tisanship is key to legislative effectiveness, albeit condition-
ally.169 Volden and Wiseman's Bipartisan Index model, which
tracks legislative cosponsorship activities as a way to under-
stand the nature of bipartisanship, found that minority party
members receive more benefit from bipartisanship activities
than majority party members as "the former require the sup-
port of the [opposing] party for their bills to survive the commit-
tee process and pass the House."7 0
In applying these concepts to McAuliffe's executive order,
this Note contends that McAuliffe's actions constructed an en-
166 Id.
167 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REv. 2311, 2317 (2006).
168 See iCL
169 See, e.g., Craig Volden & Alan E. Wiseman, Are Bipartisan Lawmakers
More Effective? (Ctr. for the Study of Democratic Insts., Working Paper: 4-2016,
2016), https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/includes/WP_4_2016_final.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/2ADV-NJFT].
170 Id. at 5.
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vironment in which cooperation between Virginia's Democratic
executive branch and Republican legislative branch was no
longer viable. The hostility between the two branches impeded
the ability of McAuliffe's office to push forward its individual
agenda, resulting in a heavy reliance on the governor's execu-
tive order power.171 As the Washington Post noted, "With 17
months left in office, McAuliffe enter[ed] the home stretch of his
four-year term with big goals in health care, economic develop-
ment and felon-rights restoration still uncertain or unmet."l72
Republicans, led by the plaintiffs of Howell, "blocked most of
the governor's legislative priorities, including expanding Medi-
caid under the Affordable Care Act," leading McAuliffe to turn
"to executive order to get around the legislature."17 3  The
Weekly Standard reported, "Over the past four years, McAuliffe
accomplished little as governor. He was stymied by the house
of delegates, which is controlled by Republicans and led by
McAuliffe's nemesis, speaker William Howell."17 4 Moreover,
Volden and Wiseman's model indicates that the hostility was
more dangerous for the Democratic minority party rather than
the Republican majority. 5 Therefore, it is reasonable to won-
der whether McAuliffe's agendas would have had more traction
without the effects of the executive order.
Furthermore, McAuliffe's executive order hurt the felon
disenfranchisement reform by polarizing re-enfranchisement
and aligning the movement with voter gamesmanship for the
2016 election. McAuliffe's Republican critics spilled much ink
criticizing the executive order as a ploy to boost votes for then-
candidate Hillary Clinton. This perception-accurate or not-
refocused felon disenfranchisement reform as a partisan issue
dealing more with voter fraud and ballot counting, rather than
civic rights and racial justice
171 There is extensive dialogue showing the deterioration of their relationship.
For example, Virginia Senate Majority Leader Norment scathingly called McAuliffe
"blatant in his complete and unconscionable disregard for an obviously unconsti-
tutional overreach of executive authority." Travis Fain, Va. Supreme Court Throws
Out McAuliffe's Felon Restoration Orders, DAILY PRESS (July 22, 2016, 9:18 PM),
https://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-nws-scova-felon-voting-201607
22-story.html [https://perma.cc/3ECV-8KR4].
172 See Vozzella et al., supra note 157.
173 Id.
174 Fred Barnes, A Fight in Virginia Over the Proper Role of a State AG., WEEKLY
STANDARD (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.weeklystandard.com/fred-barnes/a-
fight-in-virginia-over-the-proper-role-of-a-state-ag-2010191 [https://perma.cc/
UY2W-HZUG].
175 See Volden & Wiseman, supra note 169, at 1, 5-6.
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3. Resolution of Systematic Marginalization
McAuliffe's executive order at first glance did address the
marginalization of Virginia's black population. Additionally,
the adage "all news is good news" has its place within the
American body politic. 176 And certainly, McAuliffe's executive
order did attract the national spotlight to felon disenfranchise-
ment as a policy concern. Moreover, McAuliffe's executive or-
der also re-enfranchised a substantial number of felons.
However, this Note contends McAuliffe's executive order failed
to affect the systematic marginalization as created by Virginia's
felon disenfranchisement policies. Virginia, as discussed in
Part II.A of this Note, has a lifetime ban for felons. Felons in
Virginia, once their sentences are completed, are still subjected
to disenfranchisement until they may receive pardon; assum-
ing they apply for such.177 This means that the state's treat-
ment of felon disenfranchisement is subject to reversal with the
change of power. True, the current Governor, Democrat Ralph
Northam7 8 intends to continue issuing restorations through
his term.179 However, the Virginia Democratic party's efforts to
support Virginia felon disenfranchisement reform will likely
halt if and when a Republican governor is elected to office.
Moreover, executive action "can be invalidated by the courts or
undone by legislation,"s0 as occurred in Howell v. McAuliffe.18 1
Felon disenfranchisement requires a more permanent solution.
One possible solution may come from state legislative re-
form. An example of state legislative reform is Senate Bill 340/
House Bill 980 in Maryland.18 2 In the spring of 2016, the legis-
lature of Maryland restored voting rights to 40,000 citizens in
176 See PRICE, supra note 152.
177 See Newkirk II, supra note 22.
178 In February 2019, Northam admitted to being in a racist photo found in a
yearbook page from Eastern Virginia Medical School, although he later denied
being in the photo. His approval rating is at a mere 40 percent-19 points lower
than it was in December. See Marie Albiges, Ralph Northam is Now Less Popular
than Trump in Virginia - But Democrats Hold an Edge in Fall Elections, VIRGINIAN-




180 Tom Murse, Executive Actions Versus Executive Orders, THOUGHT CO. (Mar.
26, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/executive-actions-versus-executive-or
ders-3367594 [https://perma.cc/72VY-75W8].
181 See 788 S.E.2d 706 (Va. 2016).
182 Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Maryland, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE
(Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restora
tion-efforts-maryland [https://perma.cc/PS4T-RFRD].
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the process of completing their probation or parole periods1 83
via SB 340. The legislative bill replaced previous Maryland law
that disenfranchised felons until they completed their entire
sentences, regardless of their status of incarceration.184 Lon-
gevity is not the only benefit promised by legislative felon disen-
franchisement reform. Consider the transparency that the
legislative procedure would bring to felon disenfranchise re-
form; this may address the first Braman factor as discussed in
Part II.A of this Note, where citizens consider whether an exec-
utive action objectively complies with the Constitution or with
procedure. 1 a5 The layered, procedural elements inherent in
legislation-the voting of citizens for their representatives and
the subsequent voting of legislators for amending disen-
franchisement provisions-lends legislation legitimacy under
the first Braman factor. The second Braman factor, discussed
in Part II.A, also cuts more in favor of legislation compared to
gubernatorial action, as the bipartisan nature of legislative
branches makes members of Congress less likely to face the
same concentrated backlash that governors would receive.
Certainly, there would be concerns over the toxification of bi-
partisanship in the state assembly. However, the effect would
be more diffused.
With that being said, this Note contends in Part IV that
federal legislation-contrasted with state legislation-is the
most efficient and most consistent means of reform given its
nationwide effect.
IV
THE CASE FOR REFORM VIA FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A more appropriate means to enact broad felon disen-
franchisement reform lies in the hands of the federal govern-
ment: specifically, the legislative branch. This Note briefly
argues for the passage of the Democracy Restoration Act (DRA).
The DRA was first introduced to Congress in 2008 by Demo-
cratic Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin, with the cosponsor-
ship of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island and Ben
Cardin of Maryland.1 8 6 The bill as introduced to the House of
Representatives declared that
The right of an individual who is a citizen of the United States
to vote in any election for Federal office shall not be denied or
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 See supra subpart II.A.
186 Democracy Restoration Act of 2008, H.R. 7136, 110th Cong. (2008).
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abridged because that individual has been convicted of a
criminal offense unless such individual is serving a felony
sentence in a correctional institution or facility at the time of
the election.18 7
Hence, the Democracy Restoration Act (DRA) would make it
such that no state could disenfranchise ex-felons, whether they
completed their entire sentence or were on parole or probation.
Moreover, the Democracy Restoration Act requires that ex-
felons be notified regarding their right to vote once leaving
prison, sentenced to probation, or convicted of a misdemeanor.
Since the DRA's introduction a decade ago, it has failed to
pass. In 2011, 2014, 2016, and 2018 the DRA has been re-
introduced for Congress' appraisal. The most recent iteration
of the bill was introduced in the Second Session of the 115th
Congress by Congressman Jerrold Nadler of New York.18 8 This
Note contends that the legislature should seriously consider
the passage of the Democracy Restoration Act as a response to
the significant increase in felon disenfranchisement reform
among the states. This Part begins by enunciating the consti-
tutionality of the DRA and then moves into exploring the practi-
cal benefits of the DRA as a tool for felon disenfranchisement
reform.
A. A Legislative Solution is Constitutional
Currently, the federal government has no laws governing
felon voting rights. And certainly, the Constitution allocates
substantial governance over election to the individual states.
Article 1 of the Constitution explicitly gives the states the power
to oversee federal elections. Section 4 of Article 1-also known
as the Election Clause-reads:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sena-
tors and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of
chusing [sic] Senators.'8 9
Article 1, however, also gives Congress the power to legislate to
protect the right to vote, and scholars have contended that
Section 4 of Article 1 extends Congress the power to enact felon
187 Id. at § 3 (entitled "Rights of Citizens").
188 Democracy Restoration Act of 2018, H.R. 6612, 115th Cong. (2018).
189 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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re-enfranchisement.o9 0 For example, in Oregon v. Mitchell,191
the Supreme Court upheld the legislature's ability to lower the
voting age in federal elections.19 2 Moreover, the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution'9 3 grants Congress the power to
pass legislation superseding state constitutional provisions,
such as those that codify felon disenfranchisement law. Felon
disenfranchisement reform thus would be a congressional ex-
ercise of its Article 1 powers.
Scholars also contend that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments extend congressional authority to permit nonin-
carcerated ex-felons to vote in federal elections.19 4 Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment as well as Section 2 of the Fif-
teenth Amendment allow Congress enforcement power via "ap-
propriate legislation."195 This power is "broad."19 6 Within the
context of racial reparations, legislative bills re-enfranchising
felons may be able to use the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ment as well as Hunter'9 7 to secure constitutionality.
B. A Legislative Solution is Effective
There are considerable benefits that accompany a federal
legislative solution to felon disenfranchisement, as this Note
contends. This Note's prior discussion of state disenfranchise-
ment policies has illustrated that there are significant discrep-
ancies among the states regarding felon voting rights. The
diversity in state disenfranchisement polices has caused signif-
icant confusion over which citizens are eligible to vote, and
where.
190 See, e.g., Daniel M. Katz, Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, the Voting
Rights Act, and Restoration of the Congressional Portion of the Election Ballot: The
Final Frontier of Felon Disenfranchisernent Jurisprudence?, 10 U. PA. J.L. & Soc.
CHANGE 47 (2007).
191 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
192 Id. at 121, 124.
193 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause reads: "This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."
194 See Legal Analysis of Congress' Constitutional Authority to Restore Voting




196 Id.; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004) (describing the
power as a "broad power indeed").
197 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
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Moreover, it has given rise to situations in which an indi-
vidual has a right to vote in a state without felon disen-
franchisement but does not receive that same right in an
adjacent state that does maintain felon disenfranchisement.
On a sociological level, this scenario presents a problematic
value judgment in the latter state that does not exist in the
former, thus contributing to national felon stigmatization. It
would also negatively affect the second state's accountability
levels in comparison to the first, as the second state could vote
on and pass laws that affect ex-felon individuals-despite en-
suring that ex-felons had no say or engagement with the
process.
This hypothetical illustrates some of the ways in which
states who disenfranchise felons fail to meet basic equity and
fairness conceptions built into the ideals of statehood and gov-
ernance. A federal solution would provide a comprehensive
scheme for electoral officials in federal elections, thus creating
more equity and public accountability within the states. More-
over, it would deliver a comprehensive end to felon disen-
franchisement's racialized effects by halting the process
entirely, even in states that are slower to achieve reform, truly
eradicating Jim Crow laws once and for all.
A federal solution would also eliminate substantive issues
with application of state disenfranchisement law. Research
from the ACLU indicates that state election officials do not
understand their own voter eligibility laws, or how to treat vot-
ers with previous convictions,19 8 and suggests that there is
pervasive ignorance over how eligibility affects individuals on
probation or parole, whether misdemeanor crimes can disqual-
ify voters, and how to re-register previously-disenfranchised
individuals. 9 9 Lee Rowland and Myrna Perez describe the "ad-
ministrative confusion" surrounding felon disenfranchisement
policy:
Every individual with a past conviction is allowed to vote in
Maine and Vermont, while one in Kentucky or Virginia faces
permanent disenfranchisement unless he or she is granted
discretionary clemency. The vast majority of states fall some-
where in between these two extremes, leading to complex
eligibility requirements that often bewilder local election offi-
cials and create misconceptions among people with prior
198 ERIKA WOOD & RACHEL BLOOM, DE FACTO DISENFRANCHISEMENT 1-2 (2008),
http: //www.aclu.org/votingrights/exoffenders/36992pub2008 1001.html
[https://perma.c/3LZW-PJBN).
199 Id. at 2-7.
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criminal records about their own eligibility. It is an inequity
to which we cannot subject citizens any longer.2 0 0
A federal standard would greatly address the ambiguity of vot-
ing laws by replacing the current patchwork of felon disen-
franchisement laws with a bright-line standard. Moreover, the
provision of the DRA mandating voting-rights education for
convicted persons and released persons would address
problems surrounding information inequity.
Why then, does the DRA continue to stall? The lack of
support, for the DRA boils down to partisan lines; indeed, the
entirety of the support for the House and Senate versions of the
bill is Democratic.201 Many Republican statesmen contend
that the DRA is a.veiled attempt by Democrats to unfairly ac-
quire votes.20 2 Certainly, the population of incarcerated, as
discussed earlier in this Note, skews strongly minority and is
thus more likely to vote Democratic.203 However, there are
significant concessions within the DRA that should quell con-
servative concerns. Firstly, the DRA does not affect state elec-
tions, thus addressing federalism concerns. Moreover, the
DRA only applies to ex-felons; felons who are still serving their
sentences are excluded from enfranchisement. Beyond that,
one can only surmise that partisanship-much like that of Vir-
ginia's legislature following McAuliffe's executive order-moti-
vates part of the legislative animus against the bill.
CONCLUSION
This Note contends that there is a critical need for broad
felon disenfranchisement reform across the United States and
that the American public is more than willing to adopt such
reform. This reform ought to take place via federal legislation
rather than gubernatorial action, as has been the national
trend. While former Virginia governor Terry McAuliffe laudably
attempted to use his executive order powers to achieve blanket
disenfranchisement, his actions came at significant costs to
200 Lee Rowland & Myrna P6rez, Democracy Restoration Act Would Restore
Voting Rights to Millions, HUFFINGTON PosT (June 25, 2012), https://www.huffing
tonpost.com/lee-rowland/democracy-restoration-act-b_1453413.html [https://
perma.cc/SC5N-Q2B4.
201 Democracy Restoration Act Would Allow Several Million Ex-Felons to Vote in
Federal Elections, GovTRACK.US (May 11, 2016), https://govtrackinsider.com/
democracy-restoration-act-would-allow-several-mllion-ex-felons-to-vote-in-feder
al-elections-226dO61de2bc [https://perma.cc/VUN2-J4MR].
202 Id. Note that these arguments closely track arguments against granting
Washington D.C. statehood.
203 See supra notes 81-88 and the accompanying text.
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Virginia's political efficacy and bipartisanship, and they did not
resolve the systematic racism inherent in felon disenfranchise-
ment. A better solution would be the passage of the federal
Democracy Restoration Act. Looking forward, this Note con-
templates the future of felon disenfranchisement reform upon
the national stage. Given the nation's willingness to achieve
reform-for example, Florida's November 2018 passage of ma-
jor felon re-enfranchisement via constitutional amendment-
the author anticipates that broad reform is upon the horizon
and with it the final death rattle of Jim Crow.
